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REMARKS:
I’m a sociologist, not a lawyer, so I’m going to talk
to you as a sociologist but I will make references to the
law. I’ll give you a synopsis of our understanding of the
Arab Spring. The Arab Spring is, in essence, a grassroots
outcry and movement for social justice. The reason why it
didn’t stay limited to Tunisia, but spread throughout the
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Middle East and North Africa, is that this cry reflected
deeper trends and grievances that included, most
importantly, the notion of patrilineal succession in what I
call republican monarchies. These are, basically, republican
dictators acting as if they were monarchs ready to hand
power over to their sons. Another reason is because of
conspicuous corruption. Not just corruption, which is
widespread anyway, but corruption in a very conspicuous
way, especially by the sons of these dictators and their
friends and cronies, which is visible to all. And finally, the
lack of opportunity and the lack of upward social mobility,
especially in a situation where you have a youth bulge. All
of these factors combined created this outcry, which started
in Tunisia. Because it was so quick there and so
successful, it was able to spread very quickly to other
places. Middle class youth and professionals who used
social media to organize and mobilize led it initially.
The big drawback of this movement is that the
participants refused to organize. They were willing to join
together and come out into the squares and the streets to
protest but they resisted the notion of self-organization and
leadership. This meant that over time, which didn’t take
long actually, they were overshadowed by political parties
that took advantage of the vacuum that had been created.
These parties had been there all along but had been
suppressed or illegal, or were lying low, and they were very
well organized.
The main group was the Muslim
Brotherhood, which is a Sunni Islamist movement that is
politically moderate but socially conservative. They are as
extreme as Obama is an extreme Christian, which is not at
all; or Romney, for that matter. Among Islamists, they are
moderates. In addition to their rise, there were other parties
that also took advantage of what were essentially a free-forall and a vacuum after the fall of some these dictators,
including more radical, fundamentalist groups, like the
Salafis.
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The main challenge that these parties, which are
coming to power through elections, face is solving the very
deep economic crisis that exists throughout the region,
especially in North Africa. The problem is that these
parties have no experience in governance. They don’t have
the capacity and they don’t have the tools to address this
very deep economic crisis. So it is very likely – and we
should look at this on a case-by-case basis, because each
country is going to be a little bit different – that the future
will bring either a descent into chaos, which hopefully will
not happen but is certainly a possibility, or a new trend
towards authoritarianism. The only way to keep people on
board and quiescent is to create new forms of
authoritarianism. Of course, people have now found their
voice, but the problems, which are very deep, are not being
resolved. As such, the people are going to make claims
that the state will not be able to satisfy. In addition, we
have had elections in many places and now we are facing
constitutional battles in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and possibly
Yemen.
As these events took place, when the first dictator
fell and then the second, the third dictator said, “Hey, wait
a minute. This is not going my way.” This was Qadhafi,
and unfortunately for him, he ended up on the side of the
ledger with the ex-dictators, or as a dead dictator in his
case. Another one, Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, also
ended up an ex-dictator. But the remaining ones, with
Qadhafi first, put up a fight. Qadhafi lost because of the
combination of popular uprising and military intervention,
and the other dictators learned the lesson, especially the
next one in line: the leader of Syria, Bashar al-Assad. They
did everything in their power to head off popular uprisings
in their countries. This included the region’s monarchs,
who have been handing over power to their sons for
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generations. Their populations have generally accepted this.
Yet these monarchies have the same socio-economic
problems and same issues of social injustice and corruption
that we saw in the republican states. They include Jordan,
Morocco, and the Gulf monarchies. Some of the latter are
immensely wealthy and therefore can buy off their own
people more easily than the relatively poor states in North
Africa.
When the surviving regimes realized that they
might be next they decided to sow discord, which was the
easiest thing to do. They set people up against each other.
How? By pushing certain buttons. The most important
button was the sectarian one. So they said about a certain
group, “Those people are Shia and they want to gain power,
and you as Sunnis, you should help us resist them, or civil
war and chaos will ensue.” They said this very explicitly
and it worked like a song. It worked in Bahrain and it
worked in Syria. The result in Bahrain has been a kind of
stalemate: the regime remains very strong and enjoys the
regional support from Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf
states. In Syria, the result has been civil war – the regime’s
threat come true.
The rise of sectarianism must be understood in the
context of a larger regional struggle between Sunnidominated and Shia-dominated states, but also between
Iran and the Arab world. Iran is a predominantly Shia
country and the Arab states are mostly Sunni, some with
substantial Shia minorities, or even a majority. For
example, Iraq has a Shia majority, as does Lebanon and
Bahrain. So the Arab world is actually divided between
Sunni and Shia. Many of the Sunnis consider Shias as
proxies for Iran. There is a political cold war between Iran
and the Arab world, but it takes sectarian overtones. This is
very dangerous and destructive.
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You will also see that some of the stronger states,
Iran on one side and Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and
Turkey – the Sunni states – on the other, are fighting this
cold war in the territory of the weaker states, such as
Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen. The
question is: Is this like the old cold war between the super
powers, where there were hot conflicts fought by proxies in
other places, or are we going to see some kind of
stalemate? That is the big question with regard to the
Syrian civil war.
Finally, on United States (U.S.) policy, the Obama
administration has been essentially bewildered and
perplexed, not knowing how really to respond, because
these events are out of the administration’s control. This
was the first time where, at mass protests in the Arab street,
you didn’t hear the slogan “Down with the U.S.” The fact
that the U.S. was irrelevant is very interesting. It meant
that, in a way, President Obama had a free pass at first, but
also that he had to keep a low profile and play things very
carefully in order to take advantage of the Arab Spring so
that, in the end, the U.S. would find itself “on the right side
of history.” As such, essentially de facto, the U.S. chose
the side of the new powers-that-be, primarily the Muslim
Brotherhood, in the countries that have undergone a
democratic transition. You won’t find the administration
saying this explicitly, but that is what is happening.
Now we find the U.S. suddenly with new allies who
used to be persona-non-grata. As a U.S. official, you used
to generally not be able, or allowed, to speak to the Muslim
Brotherhood. Perhaps low-level diplomats could contact
them but you definitely were not able to have open
relations with this group.
Now this has changed
dramatically. At the same time, old allies have become
intensely embarrassing. One example of this is the Bahrain
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monarchy, which has undertaken a series of highly
repressive measures against its Shia population. Even the
U.S. says this is the wrong thing to do, but at the same
time, the Obama administration recognizes Bahrain is a
strong and strategic ally, and so they reason, “We have a lot
of military assets there, we face an Iranian enemy across
the Gulf, so what can we do?”
By contract, in Syria the U.S. has placed itself on
the side of the rebels who are trying to overthrow Bashar
al-Assad. Some of these have a jihadist agenda and are
somehow affiliated with al-Qaeda or feel an affinity
towards al-Qaeda. The U.S. has found itself de facto on
their side because it is against the regime and wants it to
fall. The U.S. cannot really pick and choose in this
confusing and fluid environment of multiple groups
seeking to topple the regime. It cannot really control where
weapons go and so de facto it is reinforcing radical groups
that are strongest because they are so particularly violent
and brutal. These groups could prevail in the end and
impose their own post-regime political agenda in Syria,
regardless of what the U.S. might wish. We thus could find
ourselves in a situation similar to that of the Mujahedeen in
Afghanistan in the 1980s, when the U.S. helped create alQaeda in the first place. This would indeed be a very
unfortunate outcome of the Arab Spring.
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